The Fog of War - Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara

The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (Errol Morris, 2003)

What stuns me about The Fog of War is that Robert S. McNamara, unlike so many of Errol Morris' subjects, does not come off a moron. Rather the contrary.

When you go into an Errol Morris film, you can be sure of what you're getting. Morris' directorial style is one of transparency (and, as Billy Wilder said, the best director is the one you don't notice); he sits back, lets the subject talk, and things take their course. Almost every time, the subject finds a way to make himself out to be a complete idiot. Whether it's coincidence that Morris often films some of the most hated people on the planet, or people in the most hated professions on the planet (in the case of the short-lived and highly underrated series First Person), I don't know. After all, most of us are morons.

McNamara, on the other hand, is very composed throughout. If he's not entirely honest the whole time (and for all we know, he might not be), he at least comes off as someone who's earnest and unapologetic-- someone who stood up for the things in which he believed in the face of a government who were committed to stupidity. (Unlike many reviewers, I didn't see the "I am not responsible, but will accept responsibility" bit as evasion; I saw it as a grand "up yours" to society. "This ain't my mess, but you're going to blame me anyway. Why should I care?".) We're all well aware that Robert McNamara made mistakes during the Vietnam War. We're all well aware that he made decisions based on incomplete, or erroneous, data. (Those are far different from mistakes.) That it was too late to do him any good when he learned of, and from, those mistakes, is irrelevant. It seems to me that the point being made by McNamara-- and, by extension, by Morris-- is that the real tragedy here is that no one else, especially no one in the current administration, has learned from Robert McNamara's mistakes, either. ****

This is an interesting, enlightening video. However, I was disappointed to learn that neither Mr. McNamara nor his "whiz kids" took any responsibility for the initial failure of the early version of the M-16 assault rifle. In earlier versions, this rifle fouled easily in the tropical climate of Viet Nam. Stories of American soldiers dying with cleaning rods in their hands,trying to clean their weapons because they would no longer fire were very distressing. Suggestions were made by soldiers to have the chamber chrome-plated fell on deaf ears; McNamara and the "whiz kids" thought if the manufacturer felt it needed a chrome-plated chamber, they would have made the rifle that way. This attitude is nothing short of arrogant. It is reminicent of the early failures of the Mark 14 torpedo during WWII.
In a responsible position such as Secretary of Defense, one would think that such a person could realize that improvements can be made to military hardware, especially when the suggestions come from the soldiers who have to rely on the weapon they are required to carry to defend their lives.

I was highly impressed with this documentary film and would strongly recommend it to those who are interested in history, the Cold War, warfare, government policy, and philosophy. It is extremely broad and has considerable depth of concept. It certainly well deserved the Academy Award for Best Documentary.

The eleven lessons acted as an armature that allowed Robert McNamara to cover a broad range of topics including the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fire bombing of Japan, the initiation of the war in Vietnam (which McNamara orchestrated) and the escalation of the war in Vietnam (which McNamara resisted).

Those who would view this film seeking to find a guilty McNamara who confesses to some feelings of guilt should look elsewhere. For as the film explains so well, the vast number of unknown forces and decision makers create an atmosphere which he calls the 'fog of war' where the best possible decisions are made at the time even though intelligence is poor, information and data is lacking, and perspective and reflection is not obtainable. McNamara also reminds us of the Cold War mentality that influenced every piece of information, every diplomatic conversation, and every military consideration. McNamara tells of his growing misgivings as the death tolls reached 25,000 and a clear conceptualization of the war had not yet been formulated outside of Cold War domino theory rhetoric. This theory did not fit the intense purpose of the North Vietnamese or the corrupt military government in South Vietnam. McNamara clearly indicates that Lyndon Johnson's political instincts and unwillingness to become vulnerable resulted in escalation of the war, all of which just made him more politically vulnerable. McNamara tells of his resignation which many felt was actually a forced termination by President Johnson. The war continues to escalate until 58,000 Americans die and President Johnson decides not to run for re-election in the face of a growing national storm against this failed, confused, and unclear mission.

The eleven lessons evoked certain themes which I will explore next:

Empathy and the ability to empathize with the enemy is critical to having a full perspective on the competition or conflict. This means trying to see the nature of the conflict from the perspective of your opponent. McNamara says we never were able to fully comprehend the perspective of the North Vietnamese. We saw the war as a chapter in the larger Cold War, a war with Communism. North Vietnam seemed to be an agent of the Communists. They on the other hand saw the USA as simply an imperial power that had decided to dominate Vietnam in the future as France had dominated Vietnam in the past. Both perspectives were tragically flawed. The Vietnamese saw themselves as engaging in a Civil War for national unification and they saw themselves as highly independent from the Russians and especially the Chinese, with whom they had fought for over 1000 years.

McNamara also points out that rationality will not save you from human error and failure. He illustrates how following a completely rational string of conclusions can be faulty as more and more erroneous information or stereotypical thinking enters the mix. Here he offers an interesting story about the Cuban Missile Crisis. As this crisis quickly escalated, the White House received two messages from the Kremlin. The first was soft and philosophical and appeared to come from Khrushchev. It asks for reflection and consideration before both sides pull the strings so tight that a knot develops that can not be untied. Then soon afterward another message arrives that appears to come from the top hard line military leaders which is hostile and threatening. Many in the White House advised President Kennedy to respond to the second with equal force. However Tommy Thompson, the former US ambassador in Russia, urged Kennedy to find a way for Khrushchev to save face. The way to allow him to save face would be for the Russians to remove their warheads but to be able to say to the world that Russia saved Cuba from destruction by the USA. McNamara also points out that despite rationality, human error in any system may bring about unwanted and terrible results.

McNamara also stresses efficiency as a guiding principle. Of course he was a whiz kid who became the first person other than a Ford family member to be the President of Ford Motors. McNamara links efficiency to the fire bombing of Japan's cities. This was a fascinating and frightening portion of this film. McNamara tells of the highly effective fire bombing of 67 Japanese cities, destroying 50 to 90 percent of these cities. These were major cities the size of Cleveland, Memphis, Nashville, Birmingham, Mobile, Charleston, Miami. The fact that the Japanese government would not surrender in the face of such death and destruction was amazing. McNamara tells of General Curtis LeMay's willingness to inflict great damage on the enemy using the most efficient means at his disposal. It sounds terrible and cruel but in fact may have shortened the war and thus brought an end to all the death. This discussion overlays McNamara's other point that sometimes to do good, one must do evil. He tells of the manner in which Curtis LeMay made decisions and related back to the burning of Atlanta by General Sherman.

McNamara points out that there are really no rules of war and that the losing side is frequently charged with war crimes but not the winning side. He relates that the fire bombing of Japan and the atomic bombs could have been viewed as war crimes if the Japanese had won the war. War crime is highly dependent on whether you are a winner or loser. However McNamara indicates that in conflict there should be some sense of proportionality that helps guide decision making and guide the extent of strike and retaliation.

McNamara points out that data is essential but then gives examples where seeing and believing were both wrong even when leadership thought they had the data they needed for decision making. This leads to a discussion regarding the need for correct information and clear objectives upon entering into warfare. In this regard the film certainly is relevant to the neo-conservatives that lead the US into the current war in Iraq.

McNamara urges flexibility of thought which he expresses as re-examination of your reasoning and a willingness to change course of action rather than stubbornly moving forward despite evidence that things are not working as expected.

Unfortunately wisdom is a result of painful error and is far different from knowledge. It is the nature of the human condition that we are only blessed with a limited number of painful events on which to build wisdom and often we pass away before applying that wisdom in the world. The story of McNamara is larger that the Cold War or the Vietnamese War. It is the story of the limitations of the human condition.

my brother, who was in the airforce, husband, and father-in-law all loved this movie. I would recommend this for everyone! Great gift

This documentary was so gripping and deep, I watched it twice in the same day. McNamara begins with his experiences as a young statistician working under LeMay during World War II. He explains the cold approaches (e.g. firebombing) devised to destroy Japan's ability to wage war. Interleaved are reflections on his personal life, which give the viewer an often unseen side of the man often labeled "An IBM Machine with Legs". We are given an inside look into the decision making processes that led to the onset and resolution of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis as well as a detailed account of the Vietnam War. He spent a significant part of his later life as an ex-SECDEF retrospectively reflecting on the major events in which he played a major part. Decades later he visits leaders of Cuba and Vietnam to learn more about the thinking and rationale of the actions of the other side.

While one might dismiss McNamara given the vast number of American and Vietnamese that died while he was SECDEF, it was moving for him to show humility. His broad and deep recognition of his biggest mistakes is an important milestone for the history of leaders of the Defense Department. Hopefully other leaders follow and admit their mistakes and demand current leaders not go down the wrong path again.

Another reviewer is correct in noting the framing of his lessons are a bit arbitrary. Some lessons overlap ("Rationality will not save us" and "You can't change human nature."), some are too general ("Get the Data"), some are too specific, and taken together, they are certainly not complete ("Avoid killing" seems like a good lesson). However, if you relate each one to the war in Iraq, you get the sense that the current administration could have done much better in their analysis and subsequent handling of the war.